Thursday, February 6, 2014


The Bund is a famous waterfront and regarded as the symbol of Shanghai for hundreds of years. It is on the west bank of Huangpu River from the Waibaidu Bridge to Nanpu Bridge and winds 1500 meters (0.93 mile) in length. The most famous and attractive sight which is at the west side of the Bund are the 26 various buildings of different architectural styles including Gothic, Baroque, Romanesque, Classicism and the Renaissance. The 1,700-meters (1,859 yards) long flood-control wall, known as 'the lovers' wall', located on the side of Huangpu River from Huangpu Park to Xinkai River and once was the most romantic corner in Shanghai in the last century. After renovation, the monotone concrete buildings that lovers leaned against in the past have been improved into hollowed-out railings full of romantic atmosphere. Standing by the railings, visitors can have a 'snap-shot' view of the scenery of Pudong Area and Huangpu River.

Before the 1840s, the Bund was a muddy narrow lane with tall reeds. It initially became a British settlement. After Shanghai was established as the trading port in 1846, a street was paved there and the riversides were reinforced. Then, rows of commercial buildings were constructed. As the UK Concession, a building boom at the end of 19th century and beginning of 20th century led to the Bund becoming a major financial hub of East Asia. It was the centre of the city's politics, economy and culture more than a hundred years ago, consulates of most countries and many banks, businesses and newspaper offices were settled there, and that's why we have these art-like buildings.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the thawing of economic policy in the People's Republic of China, buildings on the Bund were gradually returned to their former uses. Government institutions were moved out in favor of financial institutions, while hotels resumed trading as such.

In the 1990s the Shanghai government attempted to promote an extended concept of the Bund to boost tourism and land values in nearby areas. From 2008, a major reconfiguration of traffic flow along the Bund was carried out. After a 33-month upgrade, the Bund was reopened to visitors on March 28, 2010. The veil on the new Bund was finally lifted.

After the reconstruction, most transit vehicles which originally got through the ground level roads began to make their way through the new underground tunnel. The original eleven driveways on the Bund ground were compressed into four two-way lanes. Thus more space was left for expending the four major squares: Huangpu Park, Chen Yi Square, the Bund Financial Square, and the Observatory Plaza. After being reconstructed, the new Bund waterfront is neat and atmospheric. The public activity space is expansive embracing more visitors.

Tuesday, February 4, 2014


The "only child, two children policy" is expected to be adopted by the end of 2013 or early 2014, which means couples will be allowed to have two children if either parent is an only child, according to a source close to the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China.
Furthermore, experts have revealed that a more "courageous" plan is in discussion, namely an unlimited two-child policy to be adopted in 2015 when China's 12th Five-Year Plan comes to an end.
Professor Zhai has proposed a "three step program" that has reportedly gained the support of many high-profile officials. According to his proposal, from 2011 onwards, northeast China and Zhejiang province were the first to be subjected to this new adaptation; then Beijing and Shanghai would follow suit. The third step, to be taken around 2015, would see all provinces in the nation adopt this new policy.
Since the 1980s, China's population has been strictly subjected to the nation's one-child policy. It restricts urban couples to having only one child, while allowing two children when both parents are only children themselves. In the rural areas, couples are often permitted to have two children if the first child is a daughter, which is called the "one-and-half child policy."
According to official data, before 2011, approximately 35.4 percent of China's population was subjected to a strict one-child limit, and 53.6 percent to the one-and-half child policy. 9.7 percent of Chinese couples, including ethnic groups and couples who are both only children themselves, were permitted to have two children. Only 1.3 percent -- mainly ethnic minorities of Tibetan and Xinjiang Uygur descent -- was allowed to have three or more children.
The one-child policy has always remained quite controversial. Fueled partly by public disgust with rising abortion levels, calls to revoke the policy are getting louder. The majority of the demographers hold that China will not see a population explosion without the policy; instead, it will embrace a balanced sex ratio and social conflicts are bound to be alleviated.
During the mid-1980s, the then National Population and Family Planning Commission chose four rural counties to carry out pilot programs. Couples in these pilot counties were unconditionally allowed to have two children. The programs' results showed that since the 1990s, one of these pilot counties -- Jiuquan city of Gansu Province -- has seen a reduction in fertility rate and population growth.
On the other hand, however, several high-profile officials are afraid that a major diminution of the birth control policy will increase the severity of problems that come with overpopulation, and will in turn put too much pressure on the environment, natural resources, urbanization, employment, per capita GDP and average living standards.

Sunday, February 2, 2014


The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China was worth 8230 billion US dollars in 2012 9(8,2 trillion dollars). The GDP value of China represents 13.27 percent of the world economy. GDP in China is reported by the The World Bank Group. From 1960 until 2012, China GDP averaged 1102.1 USD Billion reaching an all time high of 8230.0 USD Billion in December of 2012 and a record low of 46.5 USD Billion in December of 1962. The gross domestic product (GDP) measures of national income and output for a given country's economy. The gross domestic product (GDP) is equal to the total expenditures for all final goods and services produced within the country in a stipulated period of time.
2006 – 2,2 Trillion dollars
2007 – 2,71 Trillion dollars
2008 – 3,490 Trillion dollars
2009 – 4,520 Trillion dollars
2010 – 4,990 Trillion dollars
2011 – 5,930 Trillion dollars
2012 – 7,320 Trillion dollars

final 2012 – 8,230 Trillion dollars


Many talk of China "rising." Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness from a "century of humiliation" -- and not a rise from nothing.  
Since taking over as the new leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November, Xi Jinping has created a heated discussion in China and abroad over his use of the phrase, “Chinese Dream.” In his various public speeches, he has repeatedly emphasized that achieving the Chinese Dream of a "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" was his government’s main objective. While this has been applauded enthusiastically at home, people outside of China have struggled to ascertain the precise meaning of Xi’s statement. This is unfortunate because the Chinese Dream is essential for understanding how a “rising” China views itself and its role in the world. Failure to understand its meaning will thus heighten the chances for misunderstanding, with potentially devastating consequences for all parties involved.
Although outsiders almost always speak of China’s “rise,” the Chinese like to refer to their impressive recent achievements and future planned development as “rejuvenation” (fuxing). The use of that word underscores an important point: the Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness and not a rise from nothing. In fact, rejuvenation is deeply rooted in Chinese history and the national experience, especially with regards to the so-called “century of national humiliation” that began with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and lasted through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. China’s memory of this period as a time when it was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the foundation for its modern identity and purpose.
Specifically, as proud citizens of the “Middle Kingdom” the Chinese feel a strong sense of chosenness and are extremely proud of their ancient and modern achievements. This pride is tempered, however, by the lasting trauma seared into the national conscious as a result of the country’s humiliating experiences at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism. After suffering a humiliating decline in national strength and status, the Chinese people are unwavering in their commitment to return China to its natural state of glory, thereby achieving the Chinese Dream.
This goal is hardly unique to Xi Jinping. Indeed, the explicit goal of rejuvenation goes at least as far back as Sun Yet-sen, and has been invoked by almost every modern Chinese leader from Chiang Kai-Shek to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. In this way, leaders have used national rejuvenation as a grand goal to mobilize the Chinese population to support the revolution or reforms they launched. In making these efforts, they have helped transform China into the modern and more powerful nation it is today. Far from weakening their resolve, however, China’s impressive new achievements have only strengthened its citizens’ commitment to achieving the Chinese Dream.
It bears noting that the Chinese Dream is in many ways the polar opposite of the more widely understood American Dream. Specifically, whereas the American Dream emphasizes individuals attaining personal enrichment and success, the Chinese Dream is a collective undertaking that calls upon Chinese citizens to make personal sacrifices in order to serve the greater, national good. If there is an appropriate parallel in the U.S. it would not be the American Dream but President John F. Kennedy’s appeal to the American people to “ask not what your country can do for you–ask what you can do for your country.”
Although the meaning of the Chinese Dream is practical and intuitively understood at home, it has the unfortunate consequence of remaining opaque to non-Chinese. Given that the Chinese Dream is deeply rooted in history— in particular on China’s interpretation of history which may differ in crucial ways from Japan or the United States’ own teachings of that history—there is an unavoidable chasm between how China perceives the Chinese Dream and how foreign audiences do. Not only do many non-Chinese lack a strong understanding of Chinese history, but many are not accustomed to drawing such a strong connection between historical events and current affairs.
This varying historical consciousness of different countries creates a perception gap. One need only look at the differences between how Chinese and Japanese students learn important historic events. For example, whereas Chinese students learn all the details about the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese history textbooks contain very little information on the war, so younger generations do not know much about that part of history. The Chinese youth are emotional in regard to the territorial dispute because they connect the current standoff with past humiliations, but the Japanese consider these completely separate issues. The Japanese indifference towards historical issues in turn further infuriates the Chinese.
These different historical memories have caused misperceptions between China and some of its neighbors over other sovereignty issues. For example, it seems inconceivable to the Philippines and Vietnam that China’s historical evidence of sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea should take precedent over modern international law. Consequently, these countries and others perceive China’s claims and efforts to defend them as inherently aggressive.
By contrast, the Chinese see their country as a status-quo power whose actions are inherently defensive. From this perspective, the Chinese are merely trying to protect their ancestral rights— as laid out in historical documents— from the encroachment of others. Far from seeking to gain an advantage over others, the Chinese are simply restoring the justice that was previously shattered by Western colonial powers. This is why many ordinary Chinese are outraged when they perceive their government as not being assertive enough in defending these rights.
Concurrently with pursuing the Chinese Dream, Xi has followed his predecessors in emphasizing the importance of continuing the policy of reform and opening up that Deng Xiaoping initiated two decades ago. Indeed, shortly after becoming the CCP's new leader, Xi gave a well-publicized speech in which he discussed the importance a nation must place on choosing the right path because a nation’s path is its “destiny.” Notably, Xi delivered this speech just before launching an extensive tour of Guangdong Province that mirrored the Southern Tour Deng had taken twenty years ago when his reform and opening up policies had stalled.
The timing of Xi’s speech on choosing the correct national path was a strong reaffirmation that Xi is committed to advancing Deng’s policies. This is undoubtedly the right choice; China has arguably benefited more than any other nation from the process of globalization, and embracing globalization has empowered China to the point where it can realistically aspire to fulfilling the Chinese Dream in a definitive time period.
However, in order to continue and deepen China’s reform and opening policy, Xi and his colleagues must break with their predecessors in finally acknowledging the inherent tension that exists between cultivating blind nationalism at home while embracing globalization abroad. They should be aware that patriotism can easily become nationalism, and an overly nationalistic foreign policy will antagonize China’s trading partners and undercut economic development.
The Chinese are pursuing the dream of rejuvenating the nation in the 21st century. In this process, however, China must not only modernize its financial system and infrastructure, such as railways, but also strengthen its political institutions and education system. Chinese elites should recognize that their dream of restoring China’s long lost glory should actually be geared toward a realistic, less nationalistic goal of nation building. At the same time, they should work on helping the outside world understand what exactly the Chinese Dream is. Only by doing this can the Chinese Dream be comprehended and blessed by China’s neighbors and the international community.